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Rob Vos
“Th   e only thing I know, is that I don’t know anything”
- Socrates -
Introduction
When I thought about a short answer to the main theme question for this session, I could not come up with 
anything better than a Socrates-like response. As about 150 countries have signed up as WTO members 
now, the world seems set for further trade liberalization. But multilateral negotiations under the Doha round 
have stalled and much of the controversy is about the development agenda and in many ways along the 
traditional North-South, rich-poor country dividing lines. On the one hand, there is the developed world 
which is resisting full liberalization of its agricultural sectors and the lifting of not only export subsidies, but 
in particular also domestic production subsidies, while at the same time demanding greater access to devel-
oping country markets for manufactures and services. On the other hand, there are two developing country 
camps. One consisting of large developing countries, such as India, China, Argentina and Brazil, which hope 
to reach an agreement that allows protection and development policies in precisely those manufacturing and 
services sectors, while demanding substantial reductions in OECD country tariﬀ  s and subsidies on agricul-
tural products. Th   e other developing country group is that of the poorest countries, often heavily dependent 
on aid and primary commodity exports, who feel the need to defend their preferential trade agreements and 
demand more policy space to conduct policies promoting exports and export diversiﬁ  cation. 
Th   is is, of course, a rather simpliﬁ  ed sketch of the divide, but it does reﬂ  ect diﬀ  erent perceptions as 
to how further trade liberalization would contribute to welfare increases on each side of the fence and, in ad-
dition, for the developing countries whether it will contribute to poverty reduction. Gains, if they are there, 
are often presented as aggregate welfare improvements, but the losers may not see societal gains as relevant to  
their fate and therefore perceive trade opening as such as something non-beneﬁ  cial. Much rigorous analytical 
work has not helped to overcome such controversies because, no matter how rigorous the instruments, our 
analytical tools are in the end creatures of our own perceptions of how the world works, and outcomes of our 
trade models pretty much depend on those perceptions underlying the model’s assumptions.
Nonetheless, in general, most empirical studies tend to ﬁ  nd on balance that trade opening most 
often produces overall average income gains for the economy, but the overall gains tend to be rather small, 
particularly when measuring the impact in terms of economic growth and considering the present-day 
context where in many countries much of trade has already been pretty much liberalized. Th  e  implications 
for poverty reduction are less clear, though. Th   is is in part because many studies do not look at the eﬀ  ects for 
sub-groups within society. Th   is holds in particular for global trade models which tend to conﬁ  ne the assess-
ment to aggregate welfare gains across countries. Studies that do look into the implications for sub-groups 
give a mixed picture for a variety of reasons: some methodological, some empirical. More in particular, the 
eﬀ  ects on income distribution seem to be mixed. As with the average income gains, however, also here, in 
most cases, the poverty eﬀ  ects tend to be small as far as we can tell from the existing evidence.
1  Paper presented at the ‘Trade and Poverty’ Policy Forum organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
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As mentioned, however, outcomes vary across studies: many stem from methodological diﬀ  erences 
and not just from diﬀ  erences in economic contexts. Luckily many of the methodological issues I will address 
further below are well recognized. So in this sense, we know a lot, in particular about the limitations of our 
assessment methods. Th   is observation may not be very helpful for policy makers, of course, especially if they 
are confronted with a variety of outcomes from diﬀ  erent studies which fail to make clear to what extent the 
ﬁ  ndings are sensitive to the assumptions made, and which of these matter most to determine which ﬁ  ndings 
seem to be most plausible. Without trying to be comprehensive, let me take you through what I consider to 
be the some of the key issues at stake.
Some theoretical notions and the empirical evidence
Trade reforms have been justiﬁ  ed by expected increases in eﬃ   ciency and output growth. Th  e  governments 
and international institutions promoting them have been less explicit, however, about their distributional 
consequences. During the 1990s, the predominant view was that liberalization would likely lead to better 
economic performance, at least in the medium-to-long run. According to this view, even if there are adverse 
transitional impacts, they can be cushioned by social policies and, in any case, after some time has passed 
they will be outweighed by more rapid growth. However, neither perceived theory nor the available empirical 
evidence conﬁ  rm this will necessarily be the case. Let me start with some analytical issues.
Trade and economic growth
Also from a theoretical perspective, the welfare gains from trade liberalization and free trade agreements 
(FTAs) are not obvious. In the standard approach of the old trade theory, the Viner-Meade version of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework applied to customs unions, three eﬀ  ects are seen to deter-
mine the aggregate welfare outcomes of FTAs: (i) “trade creation” as a result of changes in commodity trade 
in the countries within the customs union; (ii) “trade diversion” caused by changes in trade between the 
customs union and the rest of the world; and (iii) “terms-of-trade” eﬀ  ects triggered by changes in interna-
tional prices facing the countries. Trade creation and terms-of-trade gains are in general welfare-enhancing 
for countries within the customs union, whereas trade diversion and terms-of-trade losses are potentially 
damaging to countries outside the union. Th   is turns the question whether an FTA is welfare-increasing into 
an empirical one. From their comprehensive review of theory and empirical literature on regional trade 
agreements, Burﬁ  sher et al., (2004) draw two, what they consider to be robust conclusions regarding the 
lessons learned from the empirical work in the Viner-Meade framework. First, such agreements are gener-
ally good for the member countries and not seriously detrimental to non-members, but global (multilateral) 
liberalization would always be better. Secondly, the potential beneﬁ  ts of trade liberalization in general, and 
regional FTAs in particular, tend to be rather small as shares of national product. Th   e latter is due in part 
because the HOS framework does not take into account dynamic factors beyond the eﬃ   ciency gains from 
reallocating resources according to comparative advantage. Even these ﬁ  ndings need to be treated with some 
caution however, and the economic structures of the countries that engage in regional integration arrange-
ments considered. Venables (2003), for instance, argues that countries with what he calls “extreme” compara-
tive advantage (that is, specialization in few commodities only) have much less to gain from integration than 
countries that can specialize in a broader range of commodities. Under such conditions, forms of south-
south integration may not be beneﬁ  cial for poorer countries as it may draw, for instance, much of manufac-
turing production to the already more developed and diversiﬁ  ed economy that is part of the agreement. For 
such agreements to work out more equitably among its members, trade integration measures would have to 
be complemented with industry and other production sector development policies to strengthen economic 
integration at the national level.What we do and don’t know about trade liberalization ...          3
Th   e “new trade theory” does account for some of those forces (knowledge spill-over eﬀ  ects through 
trade, imperfect competition, rent-seeking behaviour, etc.), though related empirical work is based on more 
eclectic and less coherent frameworks. It is not surprising, therefore, that the empirical testing of the rela-
tionship between trade and economic growth has stirred some controversy and has given far from conclusive 
results (see, e.g., Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999; Baldwin, 2003; Burﬁ  sher, et al., 2004; United Nations, 2006; 
Rodriguez, 2007).
Coe, Helpman, and Hoﬀ  maister (1997), for instance, estimated trade-productivity links for 77 
developing countries, ﬁ  nding sizable spillover beneﬁ  ts of research and development in developing countries 
through exports of machinery and equipment to developed countries. Th   ey estimated that a one per cent 
increase in the import share of machinery and equipment to GDP results in a 0.3 per cent increase in total 
factor productivity (TFP). Frankel and Romer (1999) analyzed a 98-country sample, controlling for capital 
inputs per worker and schooling. Th   ey found that a one-percentage point increase in the trade share of GDP 
increased the contribution of productivity to output by about two-percentage points. But these are based on 
aggregate growth equation, overlooking that much of productivity shifts in developing countries stem from 
structural changes as economies move, in diﬀ  ering degrees, from low- to high-productivity sectors, rather 
than “pushing the production technology frontier”, as assumed in the new endogenous growth literature (see 
United Nations 2006 for such a commentary).
Th   e empirical evidence on the role of trade or openness per se in stimulating growth is also sur-
rounded by some controversy. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999),2 for example, argue that the positive links 
between openness and income growth are greatly overstated and that the empirical work is suspect given the 
mixed quality of the data and problems related to measurement and empirical methodology. Furthermore, 
most of the trade externalities are based on macro relationships between measures of openness and measures 
of income or productivity growth. Instead of openness and trade expansion, Rodrik, et al. (2004) argue for 
the primacy of institutions in explaining economic growth. Th  ey  ﬁ  nd that the eﬀ  ect of trade on income, 
after controlling for institutions and geography, is almost always insigniﬁ  cant, although it is positively related 
to eﬀ  ective institutions.
Trade reforms in general, and FTAs in particular, are often seen as vehicles to introduce additional 
reforms that make the investment environment more appealing to attract FDI from developed countries 
through which there may potentially be a transfer of global technology and increased productivity. Wald-
kirch (2006) shows that foreign investment is also subject to sovereign risk and FTAs may serve as a com-
mitment mechanism in order to achieve higher sustainable levels of FDI. Raﬀ   (2004) even argues that 
FTAs aﬀ  ect the location of FDI since governments may adjust taxes and external tariﬀ  s to compete for FDI 
– whether this raises or lowers welfare is shown to depend on the relative size of the eﬃ   ciency gain from 
integration and the revenue loss associated with tax competition. Th  ese  ﬁ  ndings reiterate the point that the 
welfare gains from trade and attraction of FDI through FTAs are context-speciﬁ  c, as well as that the gains are 
likely stronger for economies that already have more integrated domestic economies to begin with.
Finally, the old trade theory focuses on eﬃ   ciency gains through trade by concentrating on compara-
tive advantage. However, natural resource-abundant economies, for instance, have been found to have sys-
tematically lower long-term growth rates for a variety of trade and non-trade related mechanisms (see, for ex-
ample, Murshed, 2006 for a review). Low-income developing countries often have both a relative abundance 
2  See also Rodriguez (2007) for a further discussion, including a rebuttal of the critiques on the original Rodriguez-
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of labour and natural resources, but foremost remain specialized in one abundant factor in general: primary 
exports, or some others have moved towards both comparative advantages combining primary exports with 
labour-intensive maquila type exports, as has been the case in several African and the Central American 
countries, for instance. Both types of specialization share the same weaknesses when put in a broader com-
parative perspective: trade dependence on activities with weak integration with the rest of the economy, low 
levels of technological sophistication in production (hence low-knowledge spillovers) and vulnerability to 
rather high volatility in the corresponding commodity markers. As analyzed in the United Nations World 
Economic and Social Survey of 2006, such weaknesses are associated with substantially lower long-term per 
capita growth rates as compared to countries with stronger domestic linkages and which have diversiﬁ  ed into 
export commodities with higher technology content (United Nations 2006).3 Figure 1 highlights the latter 
aspect. Hence, it matters what you export, likely more so than how much you trade.
Trade liberalization and poverty
Th   e link between trade and poverty reduction would depend in the ﬁ  rst place on the implications for income 
levels and economic growth, which have been a major concern of empirical studies of the welfare implica-
3  Sánchez and Vos (2007) conﬁ  rm this, showing more sustainable gains from freer trade in Costa Rica than in Nicaragua 
in a comparative analysis of the likely eﬀ  ects on these two countries of the free trade agreement between the United 
States and the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA).
Figure 1.
Per capita GDP growth (y-axis) relative to dominant pattern of trade specialization, 
105 developing countries, 1962-2000
Source: United Nations (2006).



















1980-2000What we do and don’t know about trade liberalization ...          5
tions of trade reforms. However, the poverty implications will further depend on whether trade policies will 
also change the distribution of income. Again here we have some clear theoretical notions, but all are very 
sensitive to the key assumptions made.
Policy views stressing the output gains from trade (and through those, positive implications for pov-
erty reduction) basically stem from supply-side arguments. Th   e purpose of trade reform is to switch produc-
tion away from non-tradables and ineﬃ   cient import substitutes toward exportables in which countries have a 
comparative advantage. Presumed full employment of all resources—labour included—permits such a switch 
to be made painlessly. Standard trade theory based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model and Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem (HOS) would predict, further, that workers in developing countries would beneﬁ  t from freer trade, 
because this would lead such nations to specialize in types of production that make more intensive use of 
the most abundant factor, which would presumably be (unskilled) labour. Under the given assumptions, this 
should be conducive to greater income equality.
Empirical research on the link between trade liberalization and wage inequality in developing 
countries has produced mixed results. Evidence for East Asia indicates an improvement in income equal-
ity after a strong export-led strategy was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. In line with this view, Wood 
(1994, 1997) has found evidence of rising demand for unskilled labour and a decline in wage inequality in 
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China), and Singapore following trade liberalization. More recent evidence 
for China, however, gives an indication of widening wage inequality, however, especially across regions and 
between urban and rural sectors. Further, despite its very high growth rates (almost 10 per cent per annum 
since 1990), employment growth has been just over 1 per cent per annum when looking at oﬃ   cial labour 
statistics. Th  is  reﬂ  ects, of course, very strong labour productivity growth through structural change, but not 
all of that comes on account of trade opening, as a lot of job shedding has resulted from public enterprise 
reforms. 
In Latin America, in contrast to the ﬁ  rst Asian tigers, the opening of domestic markets to external 
competition in Latin America is mostly associated with greater wage inequality (Berry, 1998; Beyer, Rojas, 
and Vergara, 1999; Cragg and Epelbaum, 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Hanson and Harrison, 1999; 
Ocampo and Taylor, 1998; Robbins, 1996; Robbins and Gindling, 1999; Wood, 1994, 1997; Vos and Tay-
lor, 2002; Vos, Ganuza, Morley and Robinson, 2006). Much of the increase in wage inequality and unem-
ployment in several countries over the last two decades has been attributed to the change in the structure of 
labour demand in favour of skilled workers. Th   is is reﬂ  ected in the overall increase in the return to education 
for skilled labour and, in some countries, in the rise of unemployment among less-skilled individuals (Free-
man, 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Márquez and Pages (1997) estimated labour demand models 
with panel data for 18 Latin American countries and found that trade reforms had a negative eﬀ  ect on em-
ployment growth. Meanwhile, Currie and Harrison (1997), Revenga (1997), and Ros and Bouillón (2002) 
have analyzed the cases of Morocco and Mexico, respectively, and found that reductions in tariﬀ   levels and 
import quotas have had a modest but negative impact on employment, which has partly been the result of 
ﬁ  rms’ eﬀ  orts to cut margins and raise productivity.
Th   is apparent contrast between experiences could suggest that the issue is an empirical matter rather 
than a theoretical puzzle. Economists, however, do not agree on the causes of the change in the structure of 
labour demand. Th   e controversy is based mainly on the HOS model and interpretations of the recent wave 
of technological innovations, which has had strong impacts on the structure of labour demand. Because 
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ing to the HOS model, developing countries should specialize in the production of goods that are intensive 
in unskilled labour, thus increasing the relative demand for this factor and reducing wage diﬀ  erentials. Th  e 
question has been raised, however, as to whether the empirical evidence of rising inequality is suﬃ   cient to 
challenge the relevance of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, because Latin America’s comparative advantage 
may not be to specialize in labour and low-skill-intensive production. Th   is possibility has been brought up 
not only because of Latin America’s abundant endowment of natural resources, but also because the predom-
inance of low-skilled workers (say, with fewer than nine years of education) is probably less marked in the 
region’s labour force than in much of Asia and Africa. Th   ese conditions will change the expected outcomes 
of trade liberalization. Latin America’s abundant endowment of land (relative to labour) and its unequal 
distribution has been shown to drive up income inequality following trade liberalization. Other factors, such 
as China’s growing presence in world markets, for instance, may also depress wage improvements in Latin 
America’s export sectors (De Ferranti, et al., 2002; Wood, 1994). Th   ese conditions are probably only part of 
the explanation for rising inequality following trade liberalization. An alternative hypothesis suggests that the 
recent opening to trade observed in various developing countries may have unleashed a simultaneous process 
of technological modernization and an increase in capital stock that have had a positive impact on the de-
mand for skilled labour. Th   ese developments would then drive up the returns to human capital and intensify 
the dispersion of wages.
Although trade reforms may have important supply-side eﬀ  ects, aggregate demand also has an 
impact on growth and distribution, just as capital inﬂ  ows have an impact on relative prices. Th   e old import-
substitution model relied on the expansion of internal markets with rising real wages as part of its strategy. 
Under the new, more open trade regime, the question of controlling wage costs has taken centre stage. As 
long as there is enough productivity growth and no substantial displacement of workers, wage restraints 
need not be a problem because the expansion of output can create room for the growth of employment and 
real incomes. But if wage levels are seriously reduced and/or workers with high consumption propensities 
lose their jobs, then the resulting contraction of domestic demand could cut labour income in sectors that 
produce for the domestic market. Income inequality could then rise if displaced unskilled workers end up 
in informal services for which there is a declining demand. Larger inﬂ  ows of capital following liberalization 
tend to lead to real exchange-rate appreciation, which can oﬀ  set liberalization’s incentives for the production 
of traded goods and force greater reductions in real wage costs. On the demand side, though, capital inﬂ  ows 
may stimulate aggregate spending through increased domestic investment (either directly or through credit 
expansion) and lower saving (credit expansion triggering a consumption boom). Furthermore, although 
macroeconomic stabilization policies that use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor may exacerbate real 
exchange rate appreciation, inﬂ  ation can be brought under control, thereby allowing a recovery of real wages. 
Poverty, and in particular urban poverty, may decline, because much of the short-run economic expansion 
will be in non-traded goods. Th   e expansion of aggregate demand may quite likely prove to be short-lived 
if the consequent widening of the external balance is not sustainable and if volatility in short-term capital 
inﬂ  ows and a lack of regulatory control put the domestic ﬁ  nancial system at risk. However, even if a ﬁ  nancial 
crisis can be avoided, the economy may be pushed onto a deﬂ  ationary path. A stop in capital inﬂ  ows, as hap-
pened in the late 1990s, may not trigger a strong export drive in response, if there has been an earlier erosion 
of competitiveness and aggregate demand, and in this case imports will have to be slashed. Morley and 
Vos (2006) showed that exports became the main driving force of aggregate output growth in most Latin 
American countries in the second half of the 1990s, even though the export sector was not very dynamic 
and virtually none of the economies managed to increase their penetration in world markets. For sure, this is 
export-led growth on a slippery path. Th   e thrust of these observations is that the eﬀ  ects of balance of pay-What we do and don’t know about trade liberalization ...          7
ments liberalization on growth, employment, and income distribution arise out of a complex set of interac-
tions involving both the supply and the demand sides of the economy. Income redistribution, poverty and 
major shifts in relative prices are endogenous to the process, and there are no simple conclusions about the 
eﬀ  ects of liberalization.
Modelling issues
CGE models are by far the preferred framework of economists to assess the implications of trade liberal-
ization, be it unilaterally, in regional agreements or multilaterally under the umbrella of the WTO. CGE 
models have great virtues, such as bringing together demand and supply factors, a high degree of ﬂ  exibility 
in managing alternative degrees of sectoral detail and factor and household classiﬁ  cations; they have clear 
simulation purposes, and are quite suitable to conduct counterfactual analyses, which allow for ex-ante as-
sessments of the potential impact of trade liberalization on aﬀ  ected economies. CGE models have strong the-
oretical foundations in neoclassical theory, but have evolved over time to capture diﬀ  erences in the structure 
and behaviour of economies, among others, by assuming diﬀ  erent macroeconomic closure mechanisms and 
rigidities in commodity and factor markets. CGE analysis used to be quite an undertaking, typically a multi-
year project, but standardized and widely accessible frameworks plus great advances in solving algorithms 
and computer programs have greatly eased the work. Th   e numbers produced by the CGE models tend to 
have considerable inﬂ  uence in the public discourse about the eﬀ  ects of trade liberalization. Th  e  Global  Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) provides a core trade modelling framework and database to a wide network of 
users and has enabled modelling of regional and global trade scenarios. Th   e World Bank LINKAGE model 
shares many similarities with the GTAP framework and also uses the GTAP data base (Van der Mensbrug-
ghe, 2007). Th   e World Bank global trade analysis is mostly based on a dynamic version of LINKAGE. Th  e 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has developed a “standard” model which is widely used 
as a basis for country-level trade policy analysis. Again the static version of this model is very similar in its 
speciﬁ  cation as the GTAP and LINKAGE frameworks but is ﬂ  exible, among other things, in setting alterna-
tive macro closure rules. 
So much similarity in these inﬂ  uential modelling frameworks helps the comparability of diﬀ  erent 
country analyses, analyses of regional free trade agreements and alternative scenario analyses of options in 
multilateral trade negotiation, for instance. Yet, while drawing on similar modelling frameworks outcomes 
may diﬀ  er substantially. Global trade models interestingly can bring out the distribution of economic gains 
from trade by regions and countries. However, some studies predict, for instance, that agricultural liberaliza-
tion in the context of the Doha Round will lead to average income gains for sub-Saharan Africa, while others 
show losses (Anderson and Martin, 2006; Decreux and Fontagné, 2006; and Polaski, 2006). Th   e sources of 
such qualitatively important diﬀ  erences are not always immediately clear and more sensitivity analysis needs 
to be done. Many of the possible candidates are known and could relate to diﬀ  erent assumptions about key 
parameters, closure rules or other limitations to our modelling framework. Let me highlight a few by way of 
example.
On key parameters and trade functions: Armington speciﬁ  cations of trade linkages
One key feature of modelling trade linkages in the standard CGE frameworks is to use Armington speciﬁ  ca-
tions (Armington, 1969), which assumes imperfect substitutability between domestic products and imports 
(and vice versa between foreign products and exports). Th   e related import and export functions are fully 
dependent on relative prices and incomes. By assuming imperfect substitutability, the Armington speciﬁ  ca-8  DESA Working Paper No. 50
tion avoids complete specialization and makes multilateral trade easy to model. Th  e  speciﬁ  cation also forces 
the pass-through eﬀ  ects of tariﬀ  s on supply prices to be less than 100 per cent. All the mentioned CGE 
frameworks work with such Armington speciﬁ  cations. More in general, with higher Armington elasticities 
trade liberalization, will create more trade and accordingly higher incomes. Bouët (2006) reviewed 16 studies 
of global trade liberalization using global CGE frameworks showing the sensitivity of trade parameter choice. 
Th   e World Bank’s LINKAGE model, for instance, uses higher elasticities than those generated by the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) network yielding in consequence expected beneﬁ  ts from multilateral trade 
liberalization that are 33 per cent higher.
In their critical assessment of the implications of the Armington speciﬁ  cations for outcomes of trade 
liberalization, Von Arnim and Taylor (2007) show that, because of the Armington assumption, tariﬀ   cuts 
may reduce consumption, rather than enhancing it. One would expect consumption to increase because 
domestic import prices will fall with the tariﬀ   cut. However, when applying particular macro closures, one 
could obtain the opposite eﬀ  ect. If the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit is assumed to be ﬁ  xed, then a tariﬀ   reduction must be 
oﬀ  set by higher income taxes which will induce a drop in private consumption. Van Arnim and Taylor, sub-
sequently show that the higher the Armington elasticity of substitution, the lower the consumption crunch. 
Figure 2 shows this interaction of ﬁ  scal policies and liberalization under diﬀ  erent values for the Armington 
elasticity under a scenario of full global trade liberalization and a simpliﬁ  ed, two-region version of the LINK-
AGE model as constructed by Van Arnim and Taylor. Th   e implications for the assessment of the welfare 
gains thus critically depend on the closure rule used for the ﬁ  scal balance as much as the value of the Arm-
ington elasticity. In Africa’s case it could make a world of diﬀ  erence what parameter values were chosen.
As such, this ﬁ  nding need not be too worrisome as one could run scenarios under alternative ﬁ  scal 
policy rules and Armington elasticities may be estimated for the speciﬁ  c context being analyzed. Th  e  prob-
lem in many practical applications is, however, that alternative closure rules are not being tested in conjunc-
tion with alternative elasticity values and Armington elasticities are often borrowed “from elsewhere” rather 
than estimated. Th   e “elsewhere” is not always clear. Th   e Armington elasticities mostly used in the LINK-
AGE, but also in GTAP applications are typically rather high. If these are indeed “too high”, as some critics 
argue, than the welfare gains from trade liberalization may well be overestimated and the same will apply to 
all those who “borrow” such elasticities conveniently from these models. However, higher trade elasticities 
also ease the adjustment in trade balances and hence require less adjustment in other macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as the exchange rate, with further implications of such assumptions.
In fact, the possible eﬀ  ects depend not only on the value of the Armington elasticity and ﬁ  scal 
closure rule, but also on the size of the tariﬀ   cuts. In a recent country-based CGE study I conducted with 
Marco Sánchez on the welfare and poverty implications of DR-CAFTA in Nicaragua, the consumption com-
pressing eﬀ  ects of a higher Armington elasticity within a reasonable bound were not found to be very strong 
(Sánchez and Vos, 2006). In line with Van Arnim and Taylor’s argument, though, when assuming a ﬂ  exible 
government closure (and ﬁ  xed tax rates) the simulated welfare gains were slightly larger. In a similar study for 
Costa Rica though, Sánchez (2007) shows that even with rather low Armington elasticities and a ﬂ  exible ﬁ  s-
cal closure, there is no consumption compressing eﬀ  ect, essentially because the size of the tariﬀ   cuts is small. 
In global trade models, the Armington eﬀ  ect may be more important in terms of the implications 
for the terms of trade. I will discuss this also further below, but a recent paper by Van der Mensbrugghe 
(2007), brings out some sensitivities of the Armington speciﬁ  cation for the terms of trade in the context 
of the LINKAGE model. Countries can gain market shares through price reduction and to the extent your What we do and don’t know about trade liberalization ...          9
trading partners have relatively lower tariﬀ  s, your country will have to adjust export prices downward more 
strongly. A higher Armington elasticity can attenuate such terms-of-trade eﬀ  ects, because it would deﬁ  ne 
greater demand responsiveness. Simulations of the welfare gains and losses of an agreement in the Doha 
negotiations under the “standard” assumptions of LINKAGE (see below) would lead to terms-of-trade losses 
for developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. Hence diﬀ  erences in assumptions about 
Armington elasticities may well explain the diﬀ  erences in the degree of terms-of-trade losses and in the con-
clusion as to whether African countries stand to gain from the Doha Round or not.
Labour market assumptions 
Equally alternative assumptions for the labour market adjustment could yield quite diﬀ  erent results for 
the welfare and poverty outcomes. In a response to some critics, Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2007) 
analyzed the possible welfare implications of a potential Doha Round accord by running the World Bank’s 
LINKAGE model under diﬀ  erent labour market closure rules. In the standard closure rule, applied in much 
of the World Bank’s global trade analyses, wages are uniform across sectors and labour is perfectly mobile and 
fully employed. Th   ese are basic neoclassical assumptions, but can hardly be called realistic for any context. 
Under these labour market assumptions, the World Bank ﬁ  nds net positive global welfare gains from the 
Doha trade liberalization, with most of the gains accruing to the high-income countries in absolute terms, 
but the developing countries gaining equally in relative terms (see Figures 3a and 3b). South Asia, but also 
part of sub-Saharan Africa, would lose under this scenario, especially due to terms-of-trade losses (aﬀ  ecting 
all developing countries, but these regions more). Terms-of-trade losses may, as mentioned, in part be attrib-
uted to the Armington assumption. 
Source: Van Arnim and Taylor (2007: Figure 5)
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Th   e alternative labour market closures relax the assumption of a uniform wage and assume there is a 
gap in the wages for agricultural and non-agricultural workers. In the ﬁ  rst alternative such a gap exists in all 
economies. Th   is may have productivity implications as workers can move from low to high-productivity sec-
tors or vice versa. As a result, trade liberalization pushes up overall welfare gains, but on average developing 
countries would be less well oﬀ  , as in those countries greater specialization on primary, agricultural products 
would shift labour demand to the lower productivity sectors inducing an overall negative productivity eﬀ  ect, 
especially in Africa and South America (see, once again, ﬁ  gures 3a and 3b). If in addition the assumption of 
full employment is dropped for urban workers in developing countries and the agricultural-non-agricultural 
wage gap only applies for developing countries, those countries stand to gain more from the Doha round, 
but the gains are greater in developing countries with a comparative advantage in manufacturing and services 
(with generally higher productivity, compounded by gains through the use of slack capacity, i.e. lower unem-
ployment, in the economy). 
Labour market closure rules will, of course, also matter for distributional and poverty outcomes. 
If markets are segmented and labour is not fully mobile across sectors or labour categories, wage gaps will 
emerge. If wage rigidities exist, adjustment will fall on employment. Th  e  eﬀ  ects on wage inequality and em-
ployment may well oﬀ  set each other. In a study covering 16 Latin American countries which I coordinated 
for UNDP a few years ago (see Vos, Ganuza, Morley and Robinson, 2006), we found that trade liberaliza-
tion either unilaterally or multilaterally) generally gave rise to positive employment eﬀ  ects, but rising wage 
inequality, especially between skilled and unskilled workers. At the household level, however, the combi-
nation of these two eﬀ  ects would lead to little change in inequality of per capita incomes and some slight 
poverty reduction. Running the (static) CGE models under alternative labour market closure rules suggested 
that the initial economic structure was the main factor in explaining diﬀ  erences in that average ﬁ  nding. In-
equality eﬀ  ects would be stronger in the countries with more heavy reliance on (few) primary exports (such 
as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) and in some of these cases these would outweigh the positive 
employment eﬀ  ects leading to poverty increases because of trade liberalization.
Macro closure rules
Th   e implications of alternative macro closure rules on the outcomes of trade policy analysis are well known.4 
I will not go into detail here, but by way of example, let me focus on the role of the external closure. In CGE 
analysis typically two alternative external closures are considered: one can either assume that the trade bal-
ance is ﬁ  xed and the real exchange rate adjusts to equilibrate aggregate exports and imports or that the real 
exchange rate is ﬁ  xed and the trade balance is endogenous. In the type of CGE frameworks indicated above 
one should expect that trade liberalization will shift relative prices in favour of tradables and if the tradable 
goods sector has a higher average productivity and labour-intensity than non-traded activities, this should 
lead to an expansion of aggregate output and employment along the lines of the dependent-economy model. 
Th   e expansionary eﬀ  ect may be compounded, in the short run, by reduced import cost and a larger inﬂ  ux 
of foreign capital to ﬁ  nance a rising trade deﬁ  cit if import demand responds more strongly than exports to 
trade opening. Th   us, if the given conditions hold, we would expect a stronger expansionary eﬀ  ect of trade 
liberalization under a ﬁ  xed-exchange rate regime, as in this case expanding domestic demand and a widen-
ing external balance will not hit a foreign exchange constraint. Th   e ensuing real exchange rate appreciation 
depresses the positive impact on exports and traded-goods output, but if trade elasticities are relatively low 
(which typically holds in particular for primary exporters) the foreign capital impulse and expansion of non-
4  See, for example, Sen (1963), Taylor (1983, 1990), Rattsø (1982), Robinson (1989, 1991, 2003), and Dewatripont 
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Source: Van der Mensbrugghe (2007).
Figure 3a.
LINKAGE model simulation of Doha Round, real income eff  ects (in bln $) under alternative labour market closures
Figure 3b.
LINKAGE model simulation of Doha Round, real income eff  ects (% deviation) 
under alternative labour market closures
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traded goods tend to outweigh the eﬀ  ects on export production. For similar reasons, devaluations tend to be 
contractionary. Under a ﬂ  exible exchange-rate regime, the real exchange rate depreciates to accommodate a 
rising trade deﬁ  cit triggered by import liberalization while the level of foreign savings is kept ﬁ  xed. Th  e  ex-
pected result would now be a strengthening of the export drive and tradable goods output and employment, 
but more restricted aggregate demand growth as access to external borrowing is restricted. In the study on 
trade liberalization in Latin America, to which I just referred to in the above (see Vos, Ganuza, Morley and 
Robinson, 2006), we found such eﬀ  ects to be present in most cases. Because of the stronger real wage and 
employment eﬀ  ects, poverty reduction eﬀ  ects would be somewhat stronger as well (or poverty increases less). 
Many real trade models tend to assume a ﬂ  exible exchange rate for the external closure, but many 
countries retain managed or ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regimes. As indicated, the implications of this assumption 
are not trivial. Also the ﬂ  exible exchange-rate closure assumes that foreign savings are ﬁ  xed, hence ignoring 
a role for foreign ﬁ  nancing in the adjustment process to trade opening. In contrast, under a ﬁ  xed exchange 
rate, foreign savings would accommodate any ensuing trade imbalance. Th   is again may be unrealistic over 
time as countries running trade deﬁ  cits cannot inﬁ  nitely borrow abroad. Trade models, typically do not 
impose any restrictions that may emerge from debt sustainability problems or speculative capital movements 
and hence may ignore macroeconomic adjustment eﬀ  ects referred to earlier.
Dynamics
Dynamic CGE models are increasingly being applied in general equilibrium analysis of trade reforms. 
However, in most cases the dynamics is rather rudimentary. Typically, a recursive framework is used to drive 
‘dynamics’ in the form of updating stock variables, especially of capital and labour. Th   e LINKAGE, GTAP 
and IFPRI frameworks often assume, in addition, that total factor productivity growth is endogenous, re-
sponding to trade openness. Th   e latter assumption is admittedly ad hoc and not uncontested empirically, as 
discussed earlier. Also, and perhaps even more importantly, these CGE frameworks deal poorly with imper-
fect competition, as much as they are unable to handle activities shifting towards product diﬀ  erentiation or 
the introduction of entirely new activities; this may well be part of dynamic and diversiﬁ  cation responses to 
trade integration. More in general, while the insights from new trade theory are gradually being incorporated 
in some CGE applications, the more widely used model frameworks, and especially those most inﬂ  uential in 
the policy debate, are at quite some distance from fully incorporating such insights. 
Transitional problems and volatility
Most studies (and model frameworks) focus on income and (un)employment eﬀ  ects of trade liberalization 
rather than on the volatility of labour markets or transitional problems caused by structural changes in the 
economy. Jansen and Lee (2007) provide a review of studies which show that job insecurity has risen during 
periods of trade liberalization, though trade opening may not be the only factor in driving up job insecurity 
and frictional unemployment. In the CGE frameworks, labour shifts across activities are typically assumed to 
be instantaneous and painless. In practice, however, such adjustments have dramatic job and income impli-
cations for groups of workers. Social and active employment policies (for example, cash transfers, emergency 
employment programmes, retraining programmes) could attenuate such costs of course, but the eﬀ  ectiveness 
and costs of such policies typically are not part of the assessments of the welfare implications of trade reform.
Poverty analysis
Finally, the CGE frameworks have problems in adequately capturing poverty eﬀ  ects. One major reason is 
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eﬀ  ects thus are limited to the between-group income distribution of those categories. Important, within-
group distributional detail thus tends to be missing to make appropriate assessments of the implications for 
income poverty. Some CGE model frameworks (references) include distribution functions to capture such 
eﬀ  ects, but these may miss out important aspects as well, since trade liberalization is expected to induce 
structural change and shifts in the composition of labour demand and hence such distribution functions 
cannot be expected to be stable. Hence, assuming given distribution functions may still beg the question 
regarding the distributive eﬀ  ects either. For instance, if trade opening leads to less unemployment it may 
matter who in the overall distribution will ﬁ  nd a job; similarly, if higher productivity sectors demand more 
workers, a question to be answered is which workers are most likely to move to such sectors. Th   is will require 
more detailed modelling eﬀ  orts. A recent trend is to do so outside of the CGE framework through a variety 
of microsimulation methods, which I will not discuss here.5 Th   e merits of each of these methods is still to 
be tested, since – as far as I am aware of – very little work has been done in comparing such methods to see 
whether using one or the other would inﬂ  uence the simulated poverty eﬀ  ects from trade liberalization. 
Conclusions
Getting back to the initial question: what do we know about the links between trade, income and poverty? 
From the overview of issues I have given, as incomplete as they are, I should take distance from the quote 
from Socrates. In fact, we do know a lot and the wide array of studies has given us much more insight into 
those links. Also, much of the sometimes conﬂ  icting evidence can be brought back to speciﬁ  c assumptions, 
diﬀ  erences in methods and limitations in the data. Policy makers may not wish to be burdened by such 
complications, but probably they should, before running away with ﬁ  ndings which do not stand the test of 
minimal robustness. Th   e mentioned analytical and modelling problems may sound trivial and maybe they 
are. Unfortunately, however, analysts – and this may include all of us – do not always take these suﬃ   ciently 
to heart and make suﬃ   cient and relentless eﬀ  orts to justify assumptions against reality (rather than just 
make assumptions) and test for the sensitivity of the outcomes to alternative assumptions, speciﬁ  cations or 
methodological approaches. As obvious as this may seem, too little of this comes to the fore in the literature, 
especially where it comes to the interpretation for policy makers.
Having said this and at the risk of gross overgeneralization, my reading of the evidence on the 
growth and poverty eﬀ  ects of trade liberalization gives rise to the following answers as to what we know 
about this:
More trade and thus trade opening on balance tends to generate positive aggregate income ef- • 
fects, but clearly not all countries and groups within countries beneﬁ  t to the same degree and 
some stand to lose.
Employment, distribution and poverty eﬀ  ects show more mixed evidence, depending on the  • 
country case, especially on the initial production structure and options for ﬁ  nding new “special-
izations” and on the functioning of the labour market (or the assumptions made about these).
Even if these eﬀ  ects are positive they tend to be relatively small, especially when looking ahead  • 
at new trade agreements. Th   is is so, in part, because trade liberalization has already progressed 
over the past decades and additional trade opening may aﬀ  ect certain sectors or groups to some 
extent, but the eﬀ  ects on the overall economy tend to be small. Small welfare gains also result 
because of the unrealistic assumption of full employment, which – unfortunately – is still being 
5 Bourguignon,  et al. (2002), Ganuza, Paes de Barros, and Vos (2002) and Vos, Ganuza, Morley and Robinson 
(2006) offer a discussion and application of such methods in conjunction with CGE model analysis.14  DESA Working Paper No. 50
applied in most CGE analyses. It may also be due to our relative ignorance about the dynamic 
gains from trade in practice. If they are considered at all, the underlying mechanisms tend to 
be treated in rather ad hoc ways and existing evidence is ﬁ  ercely contested. Th  e  assumptions 
made about the dynamic productivity eﬀ  ects have a major bearing as to whether there will be 
any tangible growth eﬀ  ects or not. Th   e optimistic ﬁ  ndings from LINKAGE model, for instance, 
suggest that the Doha Round would generate less than a one per cent increase in the average 
world income level and some countries (either in the static or dynamic versions of the model) 
could increase average incomes to up to around 4 per cent at best. Such average income gains 
spread over a number of years translate, of course, into almost negligible increases in the growth 
rate of the economy.
We have further learned that if you want to grow faster (and probably have more poverty reduc- • 
tion), it matters more what you export and how diversiﬁ  ed your exports are than how much you 
trade. Th   is calls for more active industrial and other production sector development policies to 
accompany (or even precede) trade liberalization.
Having said all this, it is also clear that trade liberalization is no panacea for poverty reduction.  • 
Average welfare gains are mostly small and in many instances has been inequality enhancing. 
Across countries, most of the absolute gains would accrue to the developed countries. Devel-
oping countries gain or lose, depending on their trade structures and, to a large extent, on the 
terms of trade eﬀ  ects originating from trade liberalization. At the country level, mixed, but 
generally small poverty eﬀ  ects have been reported. As indicated, however, in many cases we 
cannot be entirely sure whether these would be true outcomes or “ﬁ  gments of our imagination”, 
especially where there are serious doubts about the degree of realism of the assumptions made in 
our model frameworks.
So we know much more than “nothing”, but we need to look critically at the frameworks we use and 
work much harder to improve these if we want to better guide the debate on trade policies which is still stir-
ring lots of controversy.What we do and don’t know about trade liberalization ...          15
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